Factors Influencing Intergovernmental Cooperation on Emission Reduction in Chengdu-Chongqing Urban Agglomeration: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

Jingyu Liu, Weidong Meng (), Bo Huang () and Yuyu Li
Additional contact information
Jingyu Liu: School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing 401331, China
Weidong Meng: School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
Bo Huang: School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China
Yuyu Li: School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing 401331, China

IJERPH, 2022, vol. 19, issue 22, 1-20

Abstract: In this study, we introduced the realistic problem of a dynamic carbon tax, built several evolutionary game models for cooperative emission reduction by local governments, and determined the factors that influence governments’ willingness to cooperate in emission reduction. The findings revealed that, first, the probability of governments opting for cooperative emission reduction strategies increases at different rates depending on the benefits and costs of cooperation. Second, externalities influence governments’ willingness to cooperate in emission reduction during cooperative carbon emission reduction. Furthermore, the emergence of a free-riding situation reduces the effectiveness of intergovernmental cooperation in reducing carbon emissions. Third, carbon tax policy can influence the likelihood that local governments will choose cooperative emission reduction, and different carbon tax sizes have different effects on their willingness to choose cooperative emission reduction.

Keywords: evolutionary game; dynamic carbon tax; regional cooperation; carbon emission; inter-governmental cooperation; Chengdu-Chongqing urban agglomeration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/19/22/14848/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/19/22/14848/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:19:y:2022:i:22:p:14848-:d:969830

Access Statistics for this article

IJERPH is currently edited by Ms. Jenna Liu

More articles in IJERPH from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().