Study on the Evolution of the Game of Willingness to Cooperate between Residents and Separation Enterprises in Waste Separation Considering the Convenience of Separation Facilities

Lichi Zhang (), Yanyan Jiang and Junmin Wu
Additional contact information
Lichi Zhang: School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212000, China
Yanyan Jiang: School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212000, China
Junmin Wu: School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212000, China

IJERPH, 2023, vol. 20, issue 2, 1-16

Abstract: The distributivity and complexity of separation facilities in waste separation cooperation are incorporated into the factors influencing the payoff of waste separation cooperation. The game payment matrix of waste separation cooperation is constructed based on the distributivity and complexity of separation facilities. The equilibrium solution of waste separation cooperation is obtained through the evolutionary game. The influence of different changes in distributivity and complexity of separation facilities on the willingness to cooperate in waste separation is explored through numerical analysis of cases. The study shows that when the distributivity of separation facilities is certain, the lower the complexity of separation facilities, the higher the willingness of residents and enterprises to cooperate; when the complexity of separation facilities is certain, the willingness of residents and enterprises to cooperate rises and then falls with the increase of distributivity of separation facilities; finally, when the distributivity and complexity of separation facilities change at the same time, the willingness of residents and enterprises to cooperate shows different changes with the different changes of two separation facilities convenience factors.

Keywords: separation facility convenience; distributivity; complexity; synergy; evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/20/2/1149/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/20/2/1149/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:20:y:2023:i:2:p:1149-:d:1029419

Access Statistics for this article

IJERPH is currently edited by Ms. Jenna Liu

More articles in IJERPH from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().