Pricing and Quantity Decisions under Asymmetric Carbon Emission Reduction Information and Cap-and-Trade Mechanism

Faqi Xie, Yushuang Deng and Huiru Chen ()
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Faqi Xie: School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China
Yushuang Deng: School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China
Huiru Chen: College of Mathematics and Statistics, Huanggang Normal University, Huanggang 438000, China

IJERPH, 2023, vol. 20, issue 3, 1-27

Abstract: With the continuous spread of cap-and-trade mechanisms and consumers’ great concerns about environmental issues, manufacturers strive to reduce carbon emissions. Unfortunately, they are not always willing to disclose their accurate emission reductions or may even falsify emission reduction information. By developing a signaling model, we explore the impact of the cap-and-trade mechanism and asymmetric information on the decision-making of supply chain members composed of a manufacturer regulated by the cap-and-trade mechanism, and a retailer. As a result, we show that the low-type manufacturer has the incentive to mimic the pricing behavior of the high-type manufacturer under information asymmetry. Thus, in order to avoid this mimicry, the high-type manufacturer will distort the wholesale price. Moreover, the impact of the cap-and-trade mechanism on the manufacturer depends on the initial quotas. Only when the initial quota is in the middle range does the high-type manufacturer benefit, while the low-type manufacturer suffers. Furthermore, the low-type manufacturer tends to hide emission reduction information, while the high-type manufacturer tends to disclose the information. We also address how information asymmetry weakens the emission reduction advantages of the high-type manufacturer. However, the cap-and-trade mechanism can effectively alleviate this negative effect.

Keywords: cap-and-trade; asymmetric information; emission reduction; signaling game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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