Green Agricultural Products Supply Chain Subsidy Scheme with Green Traceability and Data-Driven Marketing of the Platform

Xue Wang, Jiayuan Zhang, Deqing Ma and Hao Sun
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Xue Wang: School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China
Jiayuan Zhang: School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China
Deqing Ma: School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China
Hao Sun: School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China

IJERPH, 2023, vol. 20, issue 4, 1-29

Abstract: Government subsidies have played an important role in the development of green agriculture. In addition, the Internet platform is becoming a new channel to realize green traceability and promote the sale of agricultural products. In this context, we consider a two-level green agricultural products supply chain (GAPSC) consisting of one supplier and one Internet platform. The supplier makes green R&D investments to produce green agricultural products along with conventional agricultural products, and the platform implements green traceability and data-driven marketing. The differential game models are established under four government subsidy scenarios: no subsidy (NS), consumer subsidy (CS), supplier subsidy (SS), and supplier subsidy with green traceability cost-sharing (TSS). Then, the optimal feedback strategies under each subsidy scenario are derived using Bellman’s continuous dynamic programming theory. The comparative static analyses of key parameters are given, and the comparisons among different subsidy scenarios are conducted. Numerical examples are employed to obtain more management insights. The results show that the CS strategy is effective only if the competition intensity between two types of products is below a certain threshold. Compared to the NS scenario, the SS strategy can always improve the supplier’s green R&D level, the greenness level, market demand for green agricultural products, and the system’s utility. The TSS strategy can build on the SS strategy to further enhance the green traceability level of the platform and the greenness level and demand for green agricultural products due to the advantage of the cost-sharing mechanism. Accordingly, a win-win situation for both parties can be realized under the TSS strategy. However, the positive effect of the cost-sharing mechanism will be weakened as the supplier subsidy increases. Moreover, compared to three other scenarios, the increase in the environmental concern of the platform has a more significant negative impact on the TSS strategy.

Keywords: green agricultural products supply chain; green subsidy; platform traceability; data-driven marketing; differential game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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