Information Sharing and Environmental Policies

Fabio Antoniou, Phoebe Koundouri () and Nikos Tsakiris ()

IJERPH, 2010, vol. 7, issue 10, 1-18

Abstract: Based on the assumption that in a standard eco-dumping model governments are uncertain about future product demand and allowing governments to obtain information from firms, we examine governments’ and firms’ incentives to share information. We show that when governments regulate polluting firms through emission standards, then governments and firms will reach an agreement concerning information sharing. The opposite holds when governments regulate pollution through emission taxes.

Keywords: strategic environmental policy; pollution; emission standards; emission taxes; information sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I I1 I3 Q Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Information Sharing and Environmental Policies (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:7:y:2010:i:10:p:3561-3578:d:9803

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