Optimal Contracting of Pension Incentive: Evidence of Currency Risk Management in Multinational Companies

Jeffrey (Jun) Chen, Yun Guan and Ivy Tang
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Jeffrey (Jun) Chen: Department of Transportation, Logistics, & Finance, College of Business, North Dakota State University, 1340 Administration Ave, Fargo, ND 58105, USA
Yun Guan: College of Business, Clemson University, 105 Sikes Hall, Clemson, SC 29634, USA
Ivy Tang: Luxembourg School of Finance, Université du Luxembourg, 2, avenue de l’Université, 4365 Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg

JRFM, 2020, vol. 13, issue 2, 1-29

Abstract: Using a large sample of multinational companies (MNCs), this paper intends to explore whether executives’ pension incentives will function as a mechanism of optimal contracting in motivating firm risk management. We find that granting more pension to executives is significantly related to the higher likelihood and intensity of currency hedging strategies in MNCs. This suggests that pension incentive should promote executives to more actively manage firms’ risk. Such a positive relationship is robust to endogeneity and is more prominent in firms with strong shareholder power. We further explore the contribution of currency hedging induced by pension incentives to shareholder value. Supporting the hypothesis of optimal contracting, our results indicate that pension incentives play an important role in reconciling managerial risk preference and shareholder value creation.

Keywords: pension incentive; currency hedging; multinational companies; firm value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C E F2 F3 G (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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