Corporate Governance Quality, Ownership Structure, Agency Costs and Firm Performance. Evidence from an Emerging Economy

Haroon ur Rashid Khan, Waqas Bin Khidmat, Osama Al Hares, Naeem Muhammad and Kashif Saleem
Additional contact information
Haroon ur Rashid Khan: Faculty of Business, University of Wollongong in Dubai, Knowledge Park, Dubai P.O. Box 20183, UAE
Waqas Bin Khidmat: Department of Business Administration, Air University, Aerospace and Aviation Campus, Kamra P.O. Box 43600, Pakistan
Osama Al Hares: Faculty of Business, University of Wollongong in Dubai, Knowledge Park, Dubai P.O. Box 20183, UAE
Naeem Muhammad: Faculty of Business, University of Wollongong in Dubai, Knowledge Park, Dubai P.O. Box 20183, UAE
Kashif Saleem: Faculty of Business, University of Wollongong in Dubai, Knowledge Park, Dubai P.O. Box 20183, UAE

JRFM, 2020, vol. 13, issue 7, 1-35

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance quality and ownership structure on the relationship between the agency cost and firm performance. Both the fixed-effects model and a more robust dynamic panel generalized method of moment estimation are applied to Chinese A-listed firms for the years 2008 to 2016. The results show that the agency–performance relationship is positively moderated by (1) corporate governance quality, (2) ownership concentration, and (3) non-state ownership. State ownership has a negative effect on the agency–performance relationship. Various robust tests of an alternative measure of agency cost confirm our main conclusions. The analysis adds to the empirical literature on agency theory by providing useful insights into how corporate governance and ownership concentration can help mitigate agency–performance relationship. It also highlights the impact of ownership type on the relationship between agency cost and firm performance. Our study supports the literature that agency cost and firm performance are negatively related to the Chinese listed firms. The investors should keep in mind the proxies of agency cost while choosing a specific stock. Secondly; the abuse of managerial appropriation is higher in state-held firms as compared to non-state firms. Policymakers can use these results to devise the investor protection rules so that managerial appropriation can be minimized.

Keywords: corporate governance; ownership concentration; agency cost; firm performance; dynamic panel model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C E F2 F3 G (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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