Market Behavior in the Face of Political Violence: Evidence from Tsarist Russia

Christopher Hartwell

JRFM, 2021, vol. 14, issue 9, 1-13

Abstract: Even efficient financial markets may break down under periods of prolonged stress, especially when the ramification of an event is unclear. Political violence is such an event, sending immediate signals about possible impact on firm valuations but unclear information about the future viability of existing institutions. This paper examines the effect of political violence in 19th century Russia on its stock market; using a battery of unit root and variance ratio tests, the evidence is that Russian financial markets were mostly efficient in processing short-term information from political violence. However, when violence was at its peak between the assassination of the Tsar in 1881 and the 1905 revolution, large deviations from efficiency can be detected, as markets were unsure about the viability of the existing rules of the game.

Keywords: political violence; efficient markets; institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C E F2 F3 G (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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