The Effects of Securitization for Managing Banking Risk Using Alternative Tranching Schemes
Pedro Cadenas () and
Henryk Gzyl ()
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Pedro Cadenas: Department of Economics, Denison University, Granville, OH 43023, USA
JRFM, 2022, vol. 15, issue 10, 1-25
Abstract:
Diversification practices by banks affect their own risk of failing and the risk of the banking system as a whole (systemic risk). A seminal theoretical work has shown that linear diversification can reduce the risk of a bank failing, but at the cost of increasing systemic risk. Later, a follow-up study showed that a particular strategy of securitization with tranches can help avoid this trade-off. We extend the theoretical work on securitization by considering all possible strategies for securitization with two tranches, by finding their corresponding optimal diversification solutions, and by discussing their implications for individual and systemic risk. We show that securitization that involves exchanging a portion of both tranches brings back the dark side of diversification. In addition, we also show how different strategies of securitization can have risk amplification effects among banks when confidence shocks occur.
Keywords: diversification; securitization; structured finance; systemic risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C E F2 F3 G (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jjrfmx:v:15:y:2022:i:10:p:420-:d:920787
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