The Effects of Certificate-of-Need Laws on the Quality of Hospital Medical Services

Thomas Stratmann

JRFM, 2022, vol. 15, issue 6, 1-29

Abstract: Certificate-of-need (CON) laws restrict entry into health services by requiring healthcare providers to seek approval from state healthcare regulators before making any major capital expenditures. An important question is whether CON laws influence the quality of medical services in CON law states. For instance, if CON laws actually lower the quality of medical services, they fail to achieve their intended effect. This paper tests the hypothesis that hospitals in states with CON laws provide lower-quality services than hospitals in states without CON laws. Our overall results suggest that CON regulations lead to lower-quality care for some quality measures and have little or no effect on other quality standards. The results remain consistent across several robustness tests.

Keywords: certificate-of-need; quality of medical services; health regulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C E F2 F3 G (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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