 Do CEOs Identified as Value Investors Outperform Those Who Are Not?George Athanassakos ()
JRFM, 2024, vol. 17, issue 6, 1-18 Abstract: The aim of this study is to examine whether good asset allocation by a CEO leads to superior stock returns and, if so, how one might be able to identify CEOs that are good asset allocators. Employing US data from May 2001 to April 2019, we find that CEOs that invest the company’s cash flows according to a value-investing style seem to outperform companies that do not. We find that high goodwill to assets and high operating margin (good asset allocator) companies outperform companies with high or low goodwill to assets and low operating margin (poor asset allocator) companies. The findings are corroborated with out-of-sample (May 2019–April 2023) robustness tests. When buying other businesses, value investor CEOs ensure that their consolidated operating margins remain high, as opposed to other firms managed by poor asset allocator CEOs who buy businesses that bring down operating margins, either because they overpay or due to an inability to materialize expected synergies. Using both summary statistics and regression analysis, the findings of this study help us identify companies that allocate assets like value investors and enable us to anticipate future stock performance. For example, if a company, on average, has a goodwill/assets ratio of 41.03%, and an operating margin of 21.38%, it is likely this firm would be at the top quartile in terms of stock return performance over at least the next three years. At the same time, if a firm has a low average goodwill/assets ratio (i.e., 1.95%), its operating margins, on average, should be 24.46%, if it wants to achieve a similar performance as that of firms with high goodwill/assets. Moreover, the future stock return predictability of high (low) goodwill/assets and high (low) operating margin firms, found in this study, can help an investor develop trading strategies that can lead to superior stock price performance by effectively taking long positions in (shorting) firms that are (not) managed by value investor CEOs. Finally, the paper’s findings can also help investors in another way. For example, investors tend to be skeptical about companies with high goodwill/assets. The rule of thumb is to beware of companies carrying goodwill on their balance sheets that is more than 25% of assets. Based on our findings, this should not be a problem as long as the company’s operating margin has remained high and is rising. Keywords: asset allocation; value investor; goodwill/assets; operating margin; CEO role (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jjrfmx:v:17:y:2024:i:6:p:227-:d:1404139 Access Statistics for this article JRFM is currently edited by Ms. Chelthy Cheng More articles in JRFM from MDPI |
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