Evolutionary Game Analysis for Grassland Degradation Management, Considering the Livelihood Differentiation of Herders

Yong Sun, Hongyan Du (), Baoyin Liu, Yingluck Kanchanaroek, Junfeng Zhang and Pei Zhang
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Yong Sun: School of Public Administration, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China
Hongyan Du: Institute of Data Science and Agricultural Economics, Beijing Academy of Agriculture and Forestry Sciences, Beijing 100097, China
Baoyin Liu: Institutes of Science and Development, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
Yingluck Kanchanaroek: College of Interdisciplinary Studies, Thammasat University, Lampang 52190, Thailand
Junfeng Zhang: Institute of Data Science and Agricultural Economics, Beijing Academy of Agriculture and Forestry Sciences, Beijing 100097, China
Pei Zhang: Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China

Land, 2022, vol. 11, issue 10, 1-18

Abstract: Grassland degradation has become one of the most important ecological and environmental problems in the world, affecting the ecological balance of grassland and the welfare of residents. To reveal the impact mechanism of herders’ livelihood constraints on grassland degradation, and to explore the comprehensive management methods to ensure herders’ livelihoods and grassland ecological restoration, this paper constructed an evolutionary game model considering local governments and herders. It is found that the ideal stable equilibrium game can be achieved when certain conditions are met, that is, when the local governments actively regulate and herders moderate grazing, the grassland degradation caused by overgrazing can be reduced. The livelihood differentiation of herders significantly affects the stable equilibrium state of the evolutionary game. The local government’s regulation is the key to promoting moderate grazing of herders. The effect of incentive measures on the moderate grazing of herders is limited, while punishment measures can significantly restrict the excessive grazing behavior of herders. Policy support for household livelihood differentiation can effectively motivate herders to moderate grazing and achieve their survival and development needs to a greater extent through a non-grazing livelihood. The research results help decision-makers to formulate policies to combat grassland degradation, and promote the improvement of herders’ lives.

Keywords: grassland degradation; governance; livelihood differentiation; livelihood; sustainability; evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q15 Q2 Q24 Q28 Q5 R14 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jlands:v:11:y:2022:i:10:p:1776-:d:940296

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