The Influence of Collusive Information Dissemination on Bidder’s Collusive Willingness in Urban Construction Projects

Xiaowei Wang, Kunhui Ye, Taozhi Zhuang and Rui Liu
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Xiaowei Wang: School of Management Science and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400045, China
Kunhui Ye: School of Management Science and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400045, China
Taozhi Zhuang: School of Management Science and Real Estate, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400045, China
Rui Liu: Department of Construction and Real Estate, School of Civil Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China

Land, 2022, vol. 11, issue 5, 1-14

Abstract: The process of urbanization and urban regeneration is inseparable from the implementation of urban construction projects. Current studies show a large amount of collusive bidding in urban construction projects, which has seriously affected healthy and sustainable urban development. Therefore, the governance of collusive bidding in urban construction projects is crucial to sustainable urbanization and urban renewal. In reality, the collusion information dissemination (CID) is a key influential factor in the bidder’s collusive willingness (BCW). Knowing the influence of CID on BCW will help city managers to have a clearer understanding of the causes and governance focus of collusive bidding. Thus, the study using the multi-agent simulation technology simulates the influence of CID on BCW in different market scales, communication intensities, and trust boundaries based on the Deffuant model. The research found that the negative impact of the CID on the market is more incredible in cities with smaller market sizes, and effectively inhibiting the CID can reduce the occurrence of collusion. Moreover, the research also found that colluders always form their collusive alliances within CID networks. These findings suggest that urban managers should strengthen the suppression of collusive bidding by weakening the dissemination of collusive information and blocking the CID networks.

Keywords: collusive bidding; Deffuant model; multi-agent simulation; countermeasures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q15 Q2 Q24 Q28 Q5 R14 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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