EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Impact of Relationship Governance and Third-Party Intervention on Farmland Transfer Rents—Empirical Evidence from Rural China

Jia Chen, Jingwen Xu and Hongxiao Zhang
Additional contact information
Jia Chen: Department of Agriculture and Forestry Economics, School of Economics and Management, Nanjing Forestry University, Nanjing 210037, China
Jingwen Xu: Department of International Trade, School of Finance and Economics, Wuxi Institute of Technology, Wuxi 214121, China
Hongxiao Zhang: Department of Agriculture and Forestry Economics, School of Economics and Management, Nanjing Forestry University, Nanjing 210037, China

Land, 2022, vol. 11, issue 5, 1-16

Abstract: The marketization of transfer rent is an important symbol of the development of the farmland factor market. At present, the price formation mechanism of rent in China’s farmland market is not perfect. Based on the theoretical analysis starting with the post transaction cost of leasers, this paper uses 1648 farmland transfer samples collected by the China Land Economic Survey (CLES) in 2020, and employs OLS, 2SLS and CMP methods to empirically test the impact of relationship governance on transfer rent and the role of third-party (including county and township governments and village committees) intervention on the change in relationship governance pattern and rent decisions. The results show that the close relationship between the two sides of transfer represents the strong relationship governance functioned by the constraints of the trust and reputation mechanism, which can reduce the post transaction cost. Additionally, the two sides play a game on this part of the transaction cost, making the transfer rent lower than the market price. Furthermore, the involvement of third parties such as county and township governments and village committees in the transfer has replaced the role of relationship governance in reducing transaction cost, and changed the relationship governance pattern of acquaintance society, which makes the transfer rent close to the market price.

Keywords: farmland transfer; transaction cost; relationship governance; third-party intervention; rent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q15 Q2 Q24 Q28 Q5 R14 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/11/5/745/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2073-445X/11/5/745/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jlands:v:11:y:2022:i:5:p:745-:d:818394

Access Statistics for this article

Land is currently edited by Ms. Carol Ma

More articles in Land from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:gam:jlands:v:11:y:2022:i:5:p:745-:d:818394