Contractual Mechanisms in National Park Management: A Multi-Task Principal–Agent Model

Mingxin Lin and Zuomin Wen ()
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Mingxin Lin: College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Forestry University, Nanjing 210037, China
Zuomin Wen: College of Economics and Management, Nanjing Forestry University, Nanjing 210037, China

Land, 2024, vol. 13, issue 7, 1-27

Abstract: In the management of national parks, the principal–agent relationship is key to efficient and effective management. Based on multi-task principal–agent theory, this study examines the dual functions of central government incentives and guidance and the objectives of local National Park Administration offices in environmental conservation and reasonable resource utilization. First, this study constructs a multi-task principal–agent model for central and local governments within the national park management system and identifies effective contractual mechanisms. Second, this study examines the relationship between the intensity of central government incentives and the ecological conservation atmosphere coefficient. Third, by integrating the three stages of national park management system advancement, this study explores the central government’s incentive strategies at different stages. The findings indicate that local governments receive limited ecological conservation support, underscoring the need for long-term central government incentives. The findings also confirm that the effective management of national parks by local governments can only be achieved by eliminating external uncertainties, reducing the variable costs of innovative advancements, and controlling risk aversion in local National Park Administration processes. In addition, this study includes empirical data for sensitivity analyses to understand the robustness of the model under different scenarios. This study offers valuable insights and practical suggestions for enhancing national park management.

Keywords: national parks; multi-task principal–agent model; central and local governments; management contract; incentive strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q15 Q2 Q24 Q28 Q5 R14 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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