Stakeholder Strategies and Factors Influencing the Pilot Reform of Building Rental Housing on Collectively Owned Land: An Evolutionary Game Methodology

Linghui Liu, Dan Cheng (), Tianyi Wang and Jiangni Li
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Linghui Liu: School of Public Administration, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
Dan Cheng: School of Public Administration, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
Tianyi Wang: School of Public Administration, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
Jiangni Li: School of Public Administration, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China

Land, 2025, vol. 14, issue 4, 1-31

Abstract: Pilot policy relating to the building of rental houses on collectively owned land is crucial for forming integrated urban and rural construction land markets and promoting rural revitalization. However, inequalities in the distribution of benefits may impede pilot projects. This paper employs a mixed-methods approach combining social network analysis, case study, and game theory to analyze the strategic decisions of key stakeholders in pilot policy, aiming to identify challenges and barriers to its implementation. Local governments, rural collective economic organizations, and enterprises are defined as the three key stakeholders, according to social network analysis. The findings suggest that the successful implementation of pilot policy requires cooperation among at least two stakeholders. Key factors influencing stakeholders include policy risk, market risk, the local government’s stance on the pilot policy, communication, coordination costs, the capabilities of collective economic organizations, and expected benefits, all of which can lead to conflicts among stakeholders. Strategies to support equilibrium of the interests of all parties are proposed, in order to promote cooperation among these three core categories of stakeholders.

Keywords: collectively-owned construction land; pilot policy; core stakeholders; evolutionary game theory; renting and purchasing simultaneously (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q15 Q2 Q24 Q28 Q5 R14 R52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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