Hidden Blemish in European Law: Judgements on Unconventional Monetary Programmes

Bodo Herzog

Laws, 2021, vol. 10, issue 2, 1-13

Abstract: This article studies the hidden blemishes of two benchmark rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In 2015 and 2018, the ECJ approved two unconventional monetary instruments, among others ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ and the ‘Public Sector Purchase Program’. Yet, there is a vigorous debate about both monetary operations in law and economics. In this interdisciplinary article, we address law and economic arguments in order to elucidate insights to the legal community. In particular, we elaborate on the legal implications of a variety of concerning issues such as public policy interference, effect on wealth redistribution, erosion of democratic legitimacy and lack of effectiveness of monetary policy. These topics remain disregarded in the ECJ rulings. Consequently, the verdicts do not identify the economic boundaries of the European Central Bank’s mandate appropriately.

Keywords: European Court of Justice; Bundesverfassungsgericht; European Central Bank; European union law; German constitutional law; ultra-vires; monetary policy; unconventional programmes; PSPP; OMT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 E61 E62 F13 F42 F68 K0 K1 K2 K3 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jlawss:v:10:y:2021:i:2:p:18-:d:523047

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