Managerial Delegation and Conflicting Interest in Unionized Duopoly with Firm Heterogeneity

Shih-Shen Chen, Po-Sheng Ko, Chien-Shu Tsai () and Jen-Yao Lee
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Shih-Shen Chen: School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University of International Studies and Trade, Fuzhou 350202, China
Po-Sheng Ko: Department of Public Finance and Taxation, National Kaohsiung University of Science and Technology, Kaohsiung 807618, Taiwan
Chien-Shu Tsai: Center for Marine Affairs Studies, National Kaohsiung University of Science and Technology, Kaohsiung 807618, Taiwan
Jen-Yao Lee: Department of International Business, National Kaohsiung University of Science and Technology, Kaohsiung 807618, Taiwan

Mathematics, 2022, vol. 10, issue 22, 1-8

Abstract: This paper utilized a three-stage dynamic game to analyze the conflicts of interest between stakeholders caused by firm heterogeneity. We show that the higher the degree of heterogeneity, the higher the sales delegation incentive given. The firm’s heterogeneity scale will cause industry profit, union utility, consumer surplus and manager bonus conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the intensity of conflict is lower between the industry and the union than between the industry and consumer and between the industry and manager if the degree of heterogeneity is relatively small.

Keywords: unionized oligopoly; firm heterogeneity; managerial delegation; stakeholders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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