Strategic Licensing of Green Technologies to a Brown Rival: A Game Theoretical Analysis

Liu Liu, Ying Yuan, Xiaoya Wang and Hongfu Huang ()
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Liu Liu: School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China
Ying Yuan: School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China
Xiaoya Wang: School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China
Hongfu Huang: School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China

Mathematics, 2022, vol. 10, issue 23, 1-21

Abstract: This paper studies a green manufacturer’s strategic licensing of its green technology to a brown rival under the consideration of the green manufacturer’s environmental concerns. Consumers in the market have green awareness. Adopting the green technology not only helps manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions, but also to increase market sizes. The green manufacturer can choose from three technology licensing strategies, i.e., no licensing (N), royalty licensing (R) or fixed-fee licensing (F). The equilibrium licensing strategy can be derived by comparing the respective payoff after adopting the three strategies. It is found that the green manufacturer should choose fixed-fee licensing strategy when the market size expansion effect is strong, and the competition intensity is moderate; otherwise, the green manufacturer should choose royalty licensing strategy. Furthermore, it is found that when the green manufacturer is more concerned about environmental impacts, it will be more willing to choose fixed-fee licensing strategy, rather than royalty licensing strategy. Through numerical tests, some interesting results are also found. For example, the brown manufacturer might be hurt even if the cost reduction effect of technology licensing is relatively stronger. Moreover, it is found that consumer surplus and social welfare nonmonotonically change with the substitution level. In summary, this research tries to provide some guidelines to the industry and the society on better managing green technology diffusions.

Keywords: green technology licensing; environmental concern; competition; consumer surplus; social welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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