Language Recovery in Discrete-Event Systems against Sensor Deception Attacks

Abdeldjalil Labed, Ikram Saadaoui, Hanyu E, Mohammed A. El-Meligy, Zhiwu Li () and Mohamed Sharaf
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Abdeldjalil Labed: Institute of Systems Engineering, Macau University of Science and Technology, Taipa 999078, Macau SAR, China
Ikram Saadaoui: Mediterranean Institute of Technology, South Mediterranean University, Tunis 99628, Tunisia
Hanyu E: Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6R 2V4, Canada
Mohammed A. El-Meligy: Industrial Engineering Department, College of Engineering, King Saud University, P.O. Box 800, Riyadh 11421, Saudi Arabia
Zhiwu Li: Institute of Systems Engineering, Macau University of Science and Technology, Taipa 999078, Macau SAR, China
Mohamed Sharaf: Industrial Engineering Department, College of Engineering, King Saud University, P.O. Box 800, Riyadh 11421, Saudi Arabia

Mathematics, 2023, vol. 11, issue 10, 1-15

Abstract: Cyber-physical systems are characterized by the intrinsic combination of software and physical components that usually include (wired and wireless) communication devices, sensors, actuators, and control processing units. Some wireless devices communicate over insecure channels, rendering cyber-physical systems at risk of malicious attacks that might lead to catastrophic damage. This paper touches upon the problem of sensor deception attacks in supervisory control of discrete-event systems, where an attacker can insert, delete, or replace sensor readings to mislead the supervisor and induce system damage. We model potential attacks using nondeterministic finite-state transducers and then introduce a new defence strategy that utilizes insertion functions. Insertion functions are a type of monitoring interface that alters the system’s behaviour by adding extra observable events. Finally, we construct a nondeterministic finite-state transducer called a supervisor filter that recovers the original language generated by the plant by handling the altered language. The insertion function and the supervisor filter cooperate to control the system and confuse the intruder without confusing the supervisor.

Keywords: discrete event system; automaton; insertion function; finite-state transducer; cyber-security; sensor deception attack (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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