EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Complex Dynamic Analysis for a Rent-Seeking Game with Political Competition and Policymaker Costs

Xiuqin Yang (), Feng Liu () and Hua Wang
Additional contact information
Xiuqin Yang: School of Education, Minzu University, Beijing 100081, China
Feng Liu: School of Automation, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan 430074, China
Hua Wang: Department of Mechanical Engineering, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA

Mathematics, 2023, vol. 11, issue 21, 1-18

Abstract: This paper investigates the dynamics of rent-seeking games that include political competition and policymaker cost model. The local asymptotic stability of multiple equilibrium points and Nash equilibrium points are studied. In the rent-seeking model, the existence and stability of Flip bifurcation and Neimark–Sacker bifurcation are examined, and the corresponding theorems and conditions are derived. The theoretical conclusions of the paper are verified by numerical simulations with different parameters. The simulation graphics show that the rent-seeking game model exhibits rich dynamic behaviors, such as multi-periodic orbits, Flip bifurcation, Neimark–Sacker bifurcation, and chaotic sets.

Keywords: stability; rent-seeking games; flip bifurcation; Neimark–Sacker bifurcation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/11/21/4524/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/11/21/4524/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:11:y:2023:i:21:p:4524-:d:1273284

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematics is currently edited by Ms. Emma He

More articles in Mathematics from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:11:y:2023:i:21:p:4524-:d:1273284