Complex Dynamic Analysis for a Rent-Seeking Game with Political Competition and Policymaker Costs
Xiuqin Yang (),
Feng Liu () and
Hua Wang
Additional contact information
Xiuqin Yang: School of Education, Minzu University, Beijing 100081, China
Feng Liu: School of Automation, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan 430074, China
Hua Wang: Department of Mechanical Engineering, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA
Mathematics, 2023, vol. 11, issue 21, 1-18
Abstract:
This paper investigates the dynamics of rent-seeking games that include political competition and policymaker cost model. The local asymptotic stability of multiple equilibrium points and Nash equilibrium points are studied. In the rent-seeking model, the existence and stability of Flip bifurcation and Neimark–Sacker bifurcation are examined, and the corresponding theorems and conditions are derived. The theoretical conclusions of the paper are verified by numerical simulations with different parameters. The simulation graphics show that the rent-seeking game model exhibits rich dynamic behaviors, such as multi-periodic orbits, Flip bifurcation, Neimark–Sacker bifurcation, and chaotic sets.
Keywords: stability; rent-seeking games; flip bifurcation; Neimark–Sacker bifurcation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/11/21/4524/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/11/21/4524/ (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:11:y:2023:i:21:p:4524-:d:1273284
Access Statistics for this article
Mathematics is currently edited by Ms. Emma He
More articles in Mathematics from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().