The Influence of Demand Fluctuation and Competition Intensity on Advantages of Supply Chain Dominance

Zheng He, Shuchen Ni (), Xue Jiang and Chun Feng
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Zheng He: School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China
Shuchen Ni: School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China
Xue Jiang: School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China
Chun Feng: School of Transportation and Logistics, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China

Mathematics, 2023, vol. 11, issue 24, 1-17

Abstract: We studied a supply chain consisting of multiple suppliers and multiple retailers. We use the Cournot–Stackelberg game, the Market–Stackelberg game, and the Market–Nash game to simulate the situation where the upstream seller’s market dominance power gradually decreases while the downstream buyer’s market power increases. The equilibrium decision and supply chain performance under the three models are compared and analyzed, as well as their responses to external market changes such as demand fluctuation and market competition intensity. The research shows that (1) in a seller-dominated supply chain, the increase in buyer power reduces market equilibrium production and wholesale price; (2) in the face of strong demand fluctuations, equivalent power between upstream and downstream can contribute to the stabilization of production and wholesale prices; (3) when market demand fluctuation is small, market power brings a higher profit level, and supply chain participants would like to actively compete for market power. However, when the demand fluctuates greatly, the profit advantage brought by market dominance is no longer significant, and there is no need to spend much to fight for market dominance; (4) the fierce competition of upstream suppliers will induce upstream to give up the competition for market dominance, and make the market power less attractive to downstream retailers. While the fierce horizontal competition downstream will stimulate both suppliers and retailers to actively compete for market power, (5) sufficient market competition will improve total supply chain profit, so encouraging competition is conducive to the overall economic development of society.

Keywords: demand uncertainty; supply chain competition; Cournot–Stackelberg game; Market–Stackelberg game; Market–Nash game; power structure; supply chain dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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