A DEA Game Cross-Efficiency Model with Loss Aversion for Contractor Selection
Huixia Huang (),
Chi Zhou and
Hepu Deng
Additional contact information
Huixia Huang: Business School, Foshan University, Foshan 528225, China
Chi Zhou: School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China
Hepu Deng: School of Accounting, Information Systems and Supply Chain, RMIT University, Melbourne, VIC 3000, Australia
Mathematics, 2024, vol. 12, issue 10, 1-18
Abstract:
Evaluating and selecting appropriate contractors is critical to the success of specific construction projects in the building industry. Existing approaches for addressing this problem are unsatisfactory due to the ignorance of the multi-dimensional nature of the evaluation process and inappropriate consideration of existent risks. This study presents a DEA game cross-efficiency model with loss aversion for evaluating and selecting specific contractors. The competitiveness of the evaluation process is modeled using game theory with respect to the adoption of the cross-efficiency model. The attitude of the decision maker toward risks is tackled with the use of loss aversion, which is a phenomenon formalized in prospect theory. As a result, the proposed approach can adequately screen available contractors through prequalification and adequately consider the attitude of the decision maker toward risks, leading to effective decisions being made. An example is presented to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed model in evaluating and selecting appropriate contractors for specific construction projects. The results show that the proposed model is effective and efficient in producing a unique solution for contractor selection through appropriate modeling of the multi-dimensional contractor selection process and adequate consideration of the competition between the contractors and the attitude of the decision maker toward risks in practical situations.
Keywords: game theory; cross efficiency; loss aversion; contractor selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/12/10/1519/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/12/10/1519/ (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:12:y:2024:i:10:p:1519-:d:1393780
Access Statistics for this article
Mathematics is currently edited by Ms. Emma He
More articles in Mathematics from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().