Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of New-Energy Vehicle Promotion in China Based on Reward and Punishment Mechanisms

Rongjiang Cai, Tao Zhang (), Xi Wang, Qiaoran Jia, Shufang Zhao, Nana Liu and Xiaoguang Wang
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Rongjiang Cai: School of Economics and Management, Ningbo University of Technology, Ningbo 315211, China
Tao Zhang: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao 999078, China
Xi Wang: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao 999078, China
Qiaoran Jia: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao 999078, China
Shufang Zhao: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao 999078, China
Nana Liu: School of Economics and Management, Nanjing Institute of Technology, Nanjing 211167, China
Xiaoguang Wang: School of Mathematics and Information Engineering, Lianyungang Normal College, Lianyungang 222000, China

Mathematics, 2024, vol. 12, issue 18, 1-24

Abstract: In China, new-energy vehicles are viewed as the ultimate goal for the automobile industry, given the current focus on the “dual-carbon” target. Therefore, it is important to promote the sustainable development of this new-energy market and ensure a smooth transition from fuel-driven vehicles to new-energy vehicles. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving vehicle enterprises, consumers, and the government. It improves the tripartite evolutionary game through the mechanisms of dynamic and static rewards and punishments, respectively, using real-world data. The results show the following. (1) A fluctuation is present in the sales of new-energy vehicles by enterprises and the active promotional behavior of the government. This fluctuation leads to instability, and the behavior is difficult to accurately predict, which is not conducive new-energy vehicles’ promotion and sales. (2) A static reward and punishment mechanism can change the fluctuation threshold or peak value. Nevertheless, the stability of the system’s strategy is not the main reason that the government has been actively promoting it for a long time. However, enterprises are still wavering between new-energy and fuel vehicles. (3) The linear dynamic reward and punishment mechanism also has its defects. Although they are considered the stability control strategy of the system, they are still not conducive to stability. (4) The nonlinear dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can help the system to achieve the ideal stabilization strategy.

Keywords: new-energy vehicle; tripartite evolutionary game; mechanisms for rewards and punishments; willing consumers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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