Stochastic Evolutionary Analysis of an Aerial Attack–Defense Game in Uncertain Environments

Shiguang Hu, Le Ru (), Bo Lu, Zhenhua Wang, Wenfei Wang and Hailong Xi
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Shiguang Hu: Equipment Management and UAV Engineering College, Air Force Engineering University, Xi’an 710051, China
Le Ru: Equipment Management and UAV Engineering College, Air Force Engineering University, Xi’an 710051, China
Bo Lu: Equipment Management and UAV Engineering College, Air Force Engineering University, Xi’an 710051, China
Zhenhua Wang: College of Information Technology, Nanjing Police University, Nanjing 210023, China
Wenfei Wang: Equipment Management and UAV Engineering College, Air Force Engineering University, Xi’an 710051, China
Hailong Xi: Equipment Management and UAV Engineering College, Air Force Engineering University, Xi’an 710051, China

Mathematics, 2024, vol. 12, issue 19, 1-22

Abstract: Aiming at the problem of random environment interference in the process of strategy interaction and the behavioral evolution of an aerial attack–defense game, this paper considers the influence of the difference in the performance and value between both game players in terms of strategy evolution; explores the randomness of the complex battlefield environment, the uncertainty of the behavioral state of game players, and the limitations of the emergent situation; constructs a mathematical model of the stochastic evolution of an aerial-coordinated attack–defense game in uncertain environments; and studies the stability of the strategy interaction and behavioral decision-making process of both players of the aerial attack–defense game. Simulation results show that many factors of the performance and value between both game players have a greater impact on the strategy evolution trend in both game players, which not only causes changes in the results of the strategy selection but also affects the rate of strategy evolution for the game players. In addition, random environmental factors cause a certain degree of interference to the strategy evolution process of the game players, which usually accelerates the game players’ strategy evolution rate and greatly affects the evolution process of the game players’ strategy. This study can provide a theoretical basis and feasible reference for improving mission decision-making, response mechanisms, and system modeling of an aerial attack–defense game, which has important theoretical value and practical significance.

Keywords: operational effectiveness; behavioral decision-making; stochastic evolution; uncertainty interference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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