Dynamic Evolution Game Strategy of Government, Power Grid, and Users in Electricity Market Demand-Side Management

Xin Shen, Jianlin Tang (), Yijing Zhang, Bin Qian, Jiahao Li, Mi Zhou, Yitao Zhao and Yujun Yin
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Xin Shen: Measurement Center, Yunnan Power Grid Co., Ltd., Kunming 650051, China
Jianlin Tang: Electric Power Research Institute, China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510530, China
Yijing Zhang: Measurement Center, Yunnan Power Grid Co., Ltd., Kunming 650051, China
Bin Qian: Electric Power Research Institute, China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510530, China
Jiahao Li: Measurement Center, Yunnan Power Grid Co., Ltd., Kunming 650051, China
Mi Zhou: Electric Power Research Institute, China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510530, China
Yitao Zhao: Measurement Center, Yunnan Power Grid Co., Ltd., Kunming 650051, China
Yujun Yin: Measurement Center, Yunnan Power Grid Co., Ltd., Kunming 650051, China

Mathematics, 2024, vol. 12, issue 20, 1-39

Abstract: In the process of promoting demand-side management, the core stakeholder groups are government departments, power grid companies, and electricity users. Due to the different positions and conflicting interests of the three parties in the game, intense and complex battles will occur. This paper investigates a tripartite evolutionary game involving government, power grid companies, and electricity users in the context of demand-side management (DSM) and analyzes the dynamic interactions between government departments, power grid companies, and electricity users within the framework of DSM using evolutionary game theory. Using evolutionary game theory, we explore how incentives and strategic interactions among these three stakeholders evolve over time, affecting the stability of DSM policies. The model addresses the asymmetry in the decision-making process and examines the dynamic equilibrium outcomes under various scenarios. The results provide insights into the optimal design of incentive mechanisms to enhance DSM adoption. The findings offer practical recommendations to improve DSM policies, fostering balanced interests between government, grid companies, and users. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of strategic interactions in DSM, revealing how adaptive behaviors can enhance energy efficiency. It also underscores the importance of carefully designed incentive mechanisms in achieving long-term stability and cooperation among key stakeholders.

Keywords: power demand-side management; incentive mechanism; evolutionary game theory; evolutionary stable equilibrium; replicator dynamics equations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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