Evolutionary Game Analysis of Digital Financial Enterprises and Regulators Based on Delayed Replication Dynamic Equation

Mengzhu Xu, Zixin Liu (), Changjin Xu and Nengfa Wang
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Mengzhu Xu: School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China
Zixin Liu: School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China
Changjin Xu: Guizhou Key Laboratory of Economics System Simulation, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China
Nengfa Wang: School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China

Mathematics, 2024, vol. 12, issue 3, 1-18

Abstract: With the frequent occurrence of financial risks, financial innovation supervision has become an important research issue, and excellent regulatory strategies are of great significance to maintain the stability and sustainable development of financial markets. Thus, this paper intends to analyze the financial regulation strategies through evolutionary game theory. In this paper, the delayed replication dynamic equation and the non-delayed replication dynamic equation are established, respectively, under different reward and punishment mechanisms, and their stability conditions and evolutionary stability strategies are investigated. The analysis finds that under the static mechanism, the internal equilibrium is unstable, and the delay does not affect the stability of the system, while in the dynamic mechanism, when the delay is less than a critical value, the two sides of the game have an evolutionary stable strategy, otherwise it is unstable, and Hopf bifurcation occurs at threshold. Finally, some numerical simulation examples are provided, and the numerical results show the correctness of the proposed algorithm.

Keywords: digital financial innovation; digital financial supervision; static and dynamic mechanism; delayed replication dynamic equation; Hopf bifurcation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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