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Examining Marital Infidelity via Game Theory

Limor Dina Gonen (), Tchai Tavor and Uriel Spiegel
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Limor Dina Gonen: Department of Economics and Business Administration, Ariel University, Ariel 4070001, Israel
Tchai Tavor: Department of Economics, The Max Stern Academic College of Emek Yezreel, Yezreel Valley 1930600, Israel
Uriel Spiegel: Department of Management, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan 5290002, Israel

Mathematics, 2025, vol. 13, issue 14, 1-22

Abstract: Objective: Marital infidelity significantly impacts both the community and the institution of marriage. This study aims to develop a theoretical framework for analyzing marital infidelity through a game-theoretic lens. Methodology/Design/Approach: This research employs a game-theoretic model to predict the decision-making processes of unfaithful partners. Static game models are utilized to explore the interactions between spouses, focusing on identifying Nash equilibria that encapsulate the complexities and uncertainties inherent in infidelity-related decisions, whether through pure or mixed strategies. Results: The analysis reveals strategic dynamics in marital infidelity, where Nash equilibria indicate scenarios where one or both partners may engage in extramarital affairs. A Nash equilibrium is established when both partners perceive the benefits of infidelity as outweighing the costs, leading to diminished trust and communication. The Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium (MSNE) hypothesis suggests that spouses may oscillate between fidelity and infidelity based on probabilistic strategies. Research Implications: This study provides a game-theoretic perspective on marital infidelity, whose findings may be used to inform legal frameworks and social policies addressing the consequences of infidelity, potentially impacting family counseling and legal services. Value/Originality: This research introduces a game-theoretic approach to understanding trust and transgression in marriages, identifying two primary categories of Nash equilibria. It fills a theoretical gap while providing practical insights into marital behavior.

Keywords: marital infidelity; game theory; Nash equilibrium; mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; trust and betrayal; economic models of marriage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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