Playing Repeated Stochastic Security Games Against Non-Stationary Attackers

Ling Chen () and Runfa Zhang
Additional contact information
Ling Chen: School of Mathematics and Statistics, Taiyuan Normal University, Jinzhong 030619, China
Runfa Zhang: School of Automation and Software Engineering, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030013, China

Mathematics, 2025, vol. 13, issue 17, 1-13

Abstract: This paper investigates a repeated stochastic security game against a non-stationary attacker. Most of the work to date assumes that the defender has a repeated interaction with a fixed type of attacker. In fact, the defender is more likely to encounter changing attackers in multi-round games. A defender faces an attacker whose identity is unknown. The attacker type changes stochastically over time and the defender cannot detect when these changes occur. We adopt the BPR (Bayesian Policy Reuse) algorithm to detect the switches of the attacker, and the defender could play the accurate policy correspondingly. The experiment results show that BPR algorithm could accurately detect switches and help the defender gain more utilities than the EXP3-S algorithm.

Keywords: repeated stochastic security games; non-stationary environments; switching strategies; Bayesian Policy Reuse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/13/17/2697/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/13/17/2697/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:13:y:2025:i:17:p:2697-:d:1729922

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematics is currently edited by Ms. Emma He

More articles in Mathematics from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().