Evaluating the Effectiveness of Standardized Sales Incentive Contracts Under Agent Heterogeneity

Ning Wang, Housheng Duan () and Lang Ning
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Ning Wang: School of Business, Macau University of Science and Technology, Macau SAR, China
Housheng Duan: School of Management, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China
Lang Ning: School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China

Mathematics, 2025, vol. 13, issue 18, 1-31

Abstract: Salespeople, as the core executors of product distribution, form a classical principal–agent relationship with the firm. A substantial body of academic research has focused on how firms can develop optimal sales incentive contracts in various scenarios to achieve precise and effective motivation of their salespeople. However, in sales management practice, firms face a tradeoff between management precision and control costs. Therefore, instead of tailoring contracts for each individual, they tend to adopt standardized incentive contracts for the broader range of salespeople. This practice has called the effectiveness of standardized incentive schemes into question. These questions have received limited attention in prior research, yet they hold significant theoretical and practical relevance for optimizing sales incentive mechanisms and improving managerial effectiveness. This study underscores the critical role of salesperson heterogeneity in shaping the effectiveness of standardized incentive contracts. By constructing game-theoretical models of standardized sales incentive contracts in two scenarios and analyzing how heterogeneous salespeople respond to these contracts, the study finds that heterogeneity weakens the incentive effectiveness of standardized contracts. To address this challenge, we propose two practical evaluation methods to help firms assess and adjust both the degree of salesperson heterogeneity and the actual effectiveness of standardized incentive contracts.

Keywords: standardized incentive contracts; salesperson heterogeneity; contract effectiveness evaluation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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