An Analysis of the Mechanism and Mode Evolution for Blockchain-Empowered Research Credit Supervision Based on Prospect Theory: A Case from China

Gang Li, Zhihuang Zhao (), Ruirui Chai and Mengjiao Zhu
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Gang Li: School of Management and Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046, China
Zhihuang Zhao: School of Management and Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046, China
Ruirui Chai: School of Management and Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046, China
Mengjiao Zhu: School of Management and Economics, North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power, Zhengzhou 450046, China

Mathematics, 2025, vol. 13, issue 21, 1-36

Abstract: The crisis of research integrity triggered by academic misconduct, such as scientific fraud and paper retractions, has emerged as a critical issue demanding urgent resolution within the academic community. Blockchain (BC), with its core features of distributed ledger, peer-to-peer transmission, consensus mechanisms, timestamps, and smart contracts, offers novel technical solutions for research institutions seeking efficient models of research credit supervision. By incorporating the psychological factors of risk perception among decision-makers and the dynamic evolution of behavioral decision-making, and drawing on prospect theory, this study has constructed an evolutionary game model involving researchers, scientific research institutions, and governmental entities to examine BC-enabled research credit supervision. This model analyzes the key determinants influencing scientific research institutions’ adoption of blockchain regulation (BC regulation), elucidates the behavioral characteristics and boundary conditions of research integrity among researchers under this new regulatory paradigm, and reveals the dynamic evolutionary trajectory of collaborative supervision between governments and scientific research institutions. The findings indicate the following: (1) Compared to traditional regulation, the BC regulation demonstrates superior regulatory effectiveness at equivalent levels of researcher integrity and misconduct costs, as well as under identical settings for reputational loss and penalties. (2) In addition to cost considerations and government subsidies, factors such as loss aversion coefficient, risk preference coefficient, and privacy breach losses are critical in influencing research institutions’ decisions to implement BC regulation. (3) The evolution of blockchain-empowered regulatory models encompasses three distinct evolutionary patterns. This study provides a theoretical foundation and a simulation case to optimize regulatory strategy formulation and resource allocation, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of research credit supervision.

Keywords: blockchain; supervision on scientific research credit of scientific research institutions; prospect theory; evolution game; simulation analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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