EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Mutual Impact of Suppliers’ Online Sales Channel Choices and Platform Credit Decisions for Offline Channels

Yangyang Qin ()
Additional contact information
Yangyang Qin: School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China

Mathematics, 2025, vol. 13, issue 6, 1-29

Abstract: This study examines the strategic decisions and profit dynamics of suppliers marketing their products through both offline and online channels, alongside online e-commerce platforms providing their own consumer credit services. We develop a model that incorporates consumer disposable income, channel preferences, and credit utility. Four supply chain scenarios are analyzed: wholesale and agency models with either private or open credit strategies. Using Stackelberg game theory, we explore suppliers’ sales model choices and the conditions under which platforms extend credit to offline channels. Our results show that increasing credit utility generally leads to higher equilibrium prices, while higher service fees compel suppliers to adjust their prices, favoring lower-cost channels. Notably, suppliers are more likely to adopt the wholesale model to secure platform credit for offline sales, especially when credit service fees or credit utility are high. Furthermore, platform credit strategies are strongly influenced by suppliers’ sales model choices: In wholesale models, platforms are more inclined to extend credit to offline channels under specific conditions of high disposable income (DPI) and credit utility, whereas in agency models, open credit strategies are only adopted when both DPI proportions and credit utility are low. This research provides new insights into how platforms can tailor credit offerings based on supplier strategies, offering a theoretical foundation for consumer credit policies in multi-channel sales environments and valuable guidance for managers in determining optimal channel strategies and credit service offerings.

Keywords: consumer credit; wholesale model; agency model; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/13/6/931/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/13/6/931/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:13:y:2025:i:6:p:931-:d:1610090

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematics is currently edited by Ms. Emma He

More articles in Mathematics from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-05
Handle: RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:13:y:2025:i:6:p:931-:d:1610090