Inverse Stackelberg Solutions for Games with Many Followers

Yurii Averboukh
Additional contact information
Yurii Averboukh: Department of Control systems, Krasovskii Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics, 16, S. Kovalevskoi str. Yekaterinburg 620990, Russia

Mathematics, 2018, vol. 6, issue 9, 1-9

Abstract: The paper is devoted to inverse Stackelberg games with many players. We consider both static and differential games. The main assumption of the paper is the compactness of the strategy sets. We obtain the characterization of inverse Stackelberg solutions and under additional concavity conditions, establish the existence theorem.

Keywords: inverse Stackelberg games; incentives; differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/6/9/151/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/6/9/151/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:6:y:2018:i:9:p:151-:d:166714

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematics is currently edited by Ms. Emma He

More articles in Mathematics from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().