Evolutionary Game Analysis on Strategies in “Main Manufacturer–Supplier” Mode Considering Technology Docking and Price Concluding under Competition Condition

Ming Zhang, Jianjun Zhu, Hehua Wang and Pei Liu
Additional contact information
Ming Zhang: College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China
Jianjun Zhu: College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China
Hehua Wang: School of Business, Jinling Institute of Technology, Nanjing 211169, China
Pei Liu: College of Computer Science, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China

Mathematics, 2019, vol. 7, issue 12, 1-25

Abstract: This paper analyses the strategies of the substitutable suppliers competing to collaborate with a main manufacturer in “main manufacturer–supplier” (M-S) mode. In the research and development (R&D) of complex products, only one supplier can be chosen for one kind of part as a long-term collaboration partner with the manufacturer. The competition between substitutable suppliers focuses on the technology docking and price-concluding strategies. In this paper, one original supplier as the first-mover and one new supplier as the second-mover chose between the two strategies sequentially to compete for the collaborative preference of the manufacturer. We also took the delay cost brought by strategy changing into the consideration of the risks, which the suppliers and the manufacturer should prepare to share. With evolutionary game theory applied, we can conclude that the initial costs have little impact on suppliers’ making decisions, while the initial prices are correlated with both suppliers’ decision making. Results also show that hesitation and fluctuation periods exist in suppliers’ decision making, which have a relationship with existing strategy conditions, initial prices, and the cost caused by modifying the part. These results provide practical and reasonable managerial implications for M-S collaboration.

Keywords: main manufacturer–supplier mode; evolutionary game theory; substitutable suppliers; delay cost; manufacturer preference (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/7/12/1184/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/7/12/1184/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:7:y:2019:i:12:p:1184-:d:293765

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematics is currently edited by Ms. Emma He

More articles in Mathematics from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().