The Relationship between the Core and the Modified Cores of a Dynamic Game

Artem Sedakov and Hao Sun
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Artem Sedakov: Saint Petersburg State University, 7/9 Universitetskaya nab., 199034 Saint Petersburg, Russia
Hao Sun: Saint Petersburg State University, 7/9 Universitetskaya nab., 199034 Saint Petersburg, Russia

Mathematics, 2020, vol. 8, issue 6, 1-13

Abstract: The core as a solution to a cooperative game has the advantage that any imputation from it is undominated. In cooperative dynamic games, there is a known transformation that demonstrates another advantage of the core—time consistency—keeping players adhering to it during the course of the game. Such a transformation may change the solution, so it is essential that the new core share common imputations with the original one. In this paper, we will establish the relationship between the original core of a dynamic game and the core after the transformation, and demonstrate that the latter can be a subset of the former.

Keywords: discrete-time games; cooperation; the core; linear transformation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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