Rational Behavior in Dynamic Multicriteria Games

Anna Rettieva
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Anna Rettieva: School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China

Mathematics, 2020, vol. 8, issue 9, 1-16

Abstract: We consider a dynamic, discrete-time, game model where n players use a common resource and have different criteria to optimize. To construct a multicriteria Nash equilibrium the bargaining solution is adopted. To design a multicriteria cooperative equilibrium, a modified bargaining scheme that guarantees the fulfillment of rationality conditions is applied. The concept of dynamic stability is adopted for dynamic multicriteria games. To stabilize the multicriteria cooperative solution a time-consistent payoff distribution procedure is constructed. The conditions for rational behavior, namely irrational-behavior-proofness condition and each step rational behavior condition are defined for dynamic multicriteria games. To illustrate the presented approaches, a dynamic bi-criteria bioresource management problem with many players is investigated.

Keywords: dynamic games; multicriteria games; Nash bargaining solution; dynamic stability; rational behavior conditions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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