Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Keiichi Morimoto
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Keiichi Morimoto: School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University, 1-1, Kanda-Surugadai, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-8301, Japan

Mathematics, 2021, vol. 9, issue 10, 1-22

Abstract: Using a simple model of a coordination game, this paper explores how the information use of individuals affects an optimal committee size. Although enlarging the committee promotes information aggregation, it also stimulates the members’ coordination motive and distorts their voting behavior through higher-order beliefs. On the determination of a finite optimal committee size, the direction and degree of strategic interactions matter. When the strategic complementarity among members is strong, a finite optimal committee size exists. In contrast, it does not exist under strategic substitution. This mechanism is applied to the design of monetary policy committees in a New Keynesian model in which a committee conducts monetary policy under imperfect information.

Keywords: Condorcet jury theorem; committee; coordination game; higher-order belief; monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:9:y:2021:i:10:p:1098-:d:553633

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