Equilibrium Resolution Mechanism for Multidimensional Conflicts in Farmland Expropriation Based on a Multistage Van Damme’s Model

Yang Tang, Kairong Hong, Yucheng Zou and Yanwei Zhang
Additional contact information
Yang Tang: Department of Economy and Trade, School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
Kairong Hong: Department of Economy and Trade, School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
Yucheng Zou: Department of Economy and Trade, School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
Yanwei Zhang: Department of Land Management, College of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, China

Mathematics, 2021, vol. 9, issue 11, 1-25

Abstract: Multidimensional conflicts in farmland expropriation originate from the game of multidimensional interests between the local government and farmers. The strategy choices and equilibrium results of the two sides have evolved with changes to the situation and policy adjustments. Focusing on different types of farmland expropriation conflicts, this paper constructs a multistage Van Damme’s model of multidimensional conflicts in farmland expropriation, analyzes the stable equilibrium point of the behavior evolution of the local government and farmers under litigation settlement and nonlitigation settlement, and conducts simulation analysis on the behavior evolution and conflict resolution of both sides at different stages through MATLAB numerical simulation. The results show that (1) the interests’ game between the local government and farmers has changed periodically due to the evolution of the farmland expropriation system; (2) under litigation settlement, there is only the “government rent-seeking” conflict: in order to resolve the conflict, the cost of litigation for farmers can be reduced, while other policy interventions, such as controlling the rent-seeking ceiling of the local government and increasing the rent-seeking costs of the local government, can be implemented; (3) under nonlitigation settlement, there are three types of conflicts: to resolve the “government rent-seeking” conflict, we should control the rent-seeking ceiling of the local government and increase the rent-seeking costs of the local government or its positive social externality benefits under reasonable expropriation; to resolve the “nail household dilemma” conflict, we should increase the rent-seeking costs of farmers or their positive social externality benefits under reasonable compensation; to resolve the “extreme controversy” conflict, on the one hand, we should control the rent-seeking ceiling of farmers, and on the other hand, while controlling the rent-seeking ceiling of the local government, we should increase the farmers’ positive social externality benefits under reasonable compensation or negative social externality losses of both sides under rent seeking.

Keywords: farmland expropriation; multidimensional conflicts; evolutionary game; multistage van Damme’s model; MATLAB numerical simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/9/11/1208/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/9/11/1208/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jmathe:v:9:y:2021:i:11:p:1208-:d:562967

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematics is currently edited by Ms. Emma He

More articles in Mathematics from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().