A Monotonic Weighted Banzhaf Value for Voting Games

Conrado M. Manuel and Daniel Martín
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Conrado M. Manuel: Faculty of Statistics, Complutense University of Madrid, Puerta de Hierro, 1, 28040 Madrid, Spain
Daniel Martín: Faculty of Statistics, Complutense University of Madrid, Puerta de Hierro, 1, 28040 Madrid, Spain

Mathematics, 2021, vol. 9, issue 12, 1-23

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to extend the classical Banzhaf index of power to voting games in which players have weights representing different cooperation or bargaining abilities. The obtained value does not satisfy the classical total power property, which is justified by the imperfect cooperation. Nevertheless, it is monotonous in the weights. We also obtain three different characterizations of the value. Then we relate it to the Owen multilinear extension.

Keywords: game theory; cooperative game; Banzhaf value; weighted game; cooperation abilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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