EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Study on Added-Value Sharing Ratio of Large EPC Hydropower Project Based on Target Cost Contract: A Perspective from China

Jiyong Ding, Chen Chen, Xiaowei An, Na Wang, Wujuan Zhai and Chenhao Jin
Additional contact information
Jiyong Ding: Institute of Engineering Management, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
Chen Chen: Institute of Engineering Management, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
Xiaowei An: Institute of Engineering Management, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
Na Wang: Institute of Engineering Management, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
Wujuan Zhai: Institute of Engineering Management, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China
Chenhao Jin: Institute of Engineering Management, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China

Sustainability, 2018, vol. 10, issue 10, 1-19

Abstract: Engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) has been applied in China’s hydropower projects for its value-added advantages compared with traditional project delivery systems in theory. However, the actual performance of large EPC hydropower projects has been challenged by the complexity of the stakeholders’ interest demands and conflicts. The increasing use of target cost contracts (TCC) in the construction industry has provided a pain/gain share mechanism for the owners to incentivize contractors to complete projects within cost budgets. The added-value sharing ratio is the core element of TCC, and it predetermines how much proportion of savings the contractor can get paid if the actual cost is below the target cost, and how much proportion of overspend the contractor has to pay if the actual cost is higher than the target cost. In this paper, we consider the added-value sharing ratio under the framework of TCC based on the principal-agent theory, and look at how the added-value sharing ratio is influenced by various factors and how it affects the owner and the contractor in large EPC hydropower projects. Determination of the added-value sharing ratio in both discrete and continuous conditions are discussed, respectively. It is found that the added-value sharing ratio is relatively explicit in the discrete case, while the optimal added-value sharing model in the continuous case is more complex, which can be used to analyze the relationship between the added-value sharing ratio and the key influencing factors. Our research conclusions can provide both theoretical guidance and practical suggestions to contract design in the implementation of EPC hydropower projects, to some extent.

Keywords: hydropower project; EPC; target cost contract; added value; sharing ratio (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/10/3362/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/10/3362/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:10:p:3362-:d:171001

Access Statistics for this article

Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu

More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:10:p:3362-:d:171001