The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Sustainable Cooperation Relationship of Collaborative Innovation Network in Strategic Emerging Industries

Weiwei Liu and Jianing Yang
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Weiwei Liu: School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China
Jianing Yang: School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China

Sustainability, 2018, vol. 10, issue 12, 1-16

Abstract: Strategic emerging industries (SEIs) represent the future direction of industrial developments and are crucial in stimulating the overall and long-term development for economy and society. The government plays a key role in promoting the development of SEIs. This paper, for the first time, investigates the cooperation relationship among innovation members, such as enterprises, universities and research institutes in a collaborative innovation network of strategic emerging industries under government intervention. A three-population evolutionary game theory approach was employed under different scenarios for the government acting as the stakeholder, considering the non-profit, definite fit as well as uncertain profit when incentive and punishment policies are adopted. A novel evolutionary game model of the cooperation relationship among collaborative innovation network members under government’s intervention is established. The results of the simulation experiments show that government’s intervention significantly influences the cooperation relationship between enterprises, universities and research institutes. When the sum of financial incentives and punishments is greater than the total additional cost (TAC), enterprises, universities and research institutes should pay for collaborative innovation. Moreover, government’s financial intervention can effectively promote the cooperation between enterprises, universities and research institutes.

Keywords: collaborative innovation network; strategic emerging industries (SEIs); incentive and punishment policies; evolutionary game theory; positive cooperation; negative cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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