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Voters’ Information, Corruption, and the Efficiency of Local Public Services

Graziano Abrate (), Federico Boffa (), Fabrizio Erbetta () and Davide Vannoni ()
Additional contact information
Graziano Abrate: Department of Economics and Business, University of Piemonte Orientale, 28100 Novara, Italy
Federico Boffa: School of Economics and Management, Free University of Bolzano, 39100 Bolzano, Italy
Fabrizio Erbetta: Department of Economics and Business, University of Piemonte Orientale, 28100 Novara, Italy

Sustainability, 2018, vol. 10, issue 12, 1-22

Abstract: This paper explores the link between voters’ information, corruption, and efficiency in the context of a career concern model, where politically connected local monopolies are in charge of the provision of a local public service. We find that both a corrupt environment and a low level of voters’ information on managerial actions induce managers to reduce effort levels, thereby contributing to drive down efficiency. We test our predictions using data on solid waste management services provided by a large sample of Italian municipalities. We estimate a stochastic cost frontier model that provides robust evidence that services produced in more corrupted regions with low voters’ information are substantially less cost-efficient.

Keywords: fight against corruption; economic vote; inefficiency of the public sector; new models of public management; Governance 4.0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 O13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Related works:
Working Paper: Voters' Information, Corruption, and the Efficiency of Local Public Services (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Voters' Information, Corruption, and the Efficiency of Local Public Services (2016) Downloads
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