EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Optimal Quality Strategy and Matching Service on Crowdfunding Platforms

Wenqing Wu, Xuan Huang, Yue Li and Chien-Chi Chu
Additional contact information
Wenqing Wu: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Xuan Huang: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Yue Li: College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
Chien-Chi Chu: Department of Finance, Business School of Shantou University, Shantou 515063, China

Sustainability, 2018, vol. 10, issue 4, 1-17

Abstract: This paper develops a crowdfunding platform model incorporating quality and a matching service from the perspective of a two-sided market. It aims to explore the impact of different factors on the optimal quality threshold and matching service in a context of crowdfunding from the perspective of a two-sided market. We discuss the impact of different factors on the optimal quality threshold and matching service. Two important influential factors are under consideration, simultaneously. One is the quality threshold of admission and the other is the matching efficiency on crowdfunding platforms. This paper develops a two-sided market model incorporating quality, a matching service, and the characters of crowdfunding campaigns. After attempting to solve the model by derivative method, this paper identifies the mechanism of how the parameters influence the optimal quality threshold and matching service. Additionally, it compares the platform profits in scenarios with and without an exclusion policy. The results demonstrate that excluding low-quality projects is profitable when funder preference for project quality is substantial enough. Crowdfunding platform managers would be unwise to admit the quality threshold of the crowdfunding project and charge entrance fees when the parameter of funder preference for project quality is small.

Keywords: crowdfunding platform; matching service; quality threshold of admission; two-sided market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/4/1053/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/4/1053/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:4:p:1053-:d:139245

Access Statistics for this article

Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu

More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:4:p:1053-:d:139245