System Dynamics Analysis of Evolutionary Game Strategies between the Government and Investors Based on New Energy Power Construction Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) Project

Lei Gao and Zhen-Yu Zhao
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Lei Gao: Beijing Key Laboratory of New Energy and Low-Carbon Development, School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Changping, Beijing 102206, China
Zhen-Yu Zhao: Beijing Key Laboratory of New Energy and Low-Carbon Development, School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University, Changping, Beijing 102206, China

Sustainability, 2018, vol. 10, issue 7, 1-17

Abstract: The public-private-partnership (PPP) is a new mode for the government and social capital to jointly invest in public infrastructure projects. In particular, PPP projects for new energy power construction have been strongly supported in some countries in recent years, because it can not only reduce financial pressure on the government, but also promote the development of new energy. Current scholars study the economic benefits of PPP projects for new energy power construction from a macro perspective, and they rarely study behavioral strategies of the government and social capital as a game process of project construction from a micro perspective. This paper will fill this gap. This study firstly built an evolutionary game model of the government and investors based on new energy power construction PPP projects. Secondly, taking China’s typical new energy power construction PPP project–waste incineration power generation as an example, the system dynamics (SD) model was proposed to simulate the evolutionary process of game players’ behavioral strategies. Finally, the effects of key factors in the construction of PPP project on the strategies’ stability were studied. The results show that: (1) there is no evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the game system between the government and investors, and system evolution is characterized by periodic behavior. (2) When the government implements dynamic bounty measures, the system evolution process is still a closed loop with periodic motion. However, when the government implements dynamic punishment measures, there is a stable ESS in the hybrid strategy of the game system. (3) The government can increase unit fines when making dynamic strategic adjustments, which will not only promote the active cooperation of investors, but also reduce the probability of government supervision, thereby reducing costs.

Keywords: new energy power; public-private-partnership (PPP); evolutionary game; behavioral strategies; system dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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