EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

A Theory of Optimal Green Defaults

Georg Meran and Reimund Schwarze

Sustainability, 2018, vol. 10, issue 8, 1-1

Abstract: This paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol–Oates efficiency of traditional single instrument abatement policies vis-à-vis green defaults in the face of price inertia and passive choice by subpopulations. In this special case of behavioural heterogeneity, command and control approaches can outperform price-based instruments while pure tax/subsidy schemes need to be adjusted in order to achieve politically desired levels of abatement. We also prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost rule is developed to optimize the green defaults and traditional policies of standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.

Keywords: nudge; policy mix; behavioural heterogeneity; environmental taxes and subsidies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 O13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/8/2902/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/8/2902/ (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: A theory of optimal green defaults (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: A Theory of Optimal Green Defaults (2015) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:8:p:2902-:d:164007

Access Statistics for this article

Sustainability is currently edited by Prof. Dr. Marc A. Rosen

More articles in Sustainability from MDPI, Open Access Journal
Bibliographic data for series maintained by XML Conversion Team ().

 
Page updated 2021-01-15
Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:8:p:2902-:d:164007