Analysis of Fallow Farming Decision-Making Behavior of Farmers Based on Hawk-Dove Game Theory: The Case of Guizhou Province

Hualin Xie and Qing Wu
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Hualin Xie: Institute of Ecological Civilization, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China
Qing Wu: Institute of Ecological Civilization, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China

Sustainability, 2019, vol. 11, issue 14, 1-15

Abstract: Implementing a land fallow policy is of great significance for ensuring China’s food security and promoting the improvement of the ecological environment. The implementation of a fallow project involves different stakeholders. Farmers are the main participants in the fallow project. The decision of farmers to practice fallow is the key factor for the successful development of the fallow project. Therefore, this study theoretically reveals the decision-making mechanism of farmers’ participation in cultivated land fallow by utilizing the hawk-dove evolutionary game theory among farmers and explains some challenges in the implementation of fallow in Guizhou Province. We drew the following conclusions: (1) The behavior of farmers will be affected by other farmers in the same situation, and the effects of mutual incentives and imitations between the groups of farmers are affected by their interests; (2) in the fallow project, the rate of choosing either fallow or unfallow depends on the ratio of fallow income to planting income. If the income of participating in fallow is higher, the demonstration effect of farmers participating in fallow is stronger, and the strategy of continued cultivation is adopted. The fewer unfallow farmers there are, the more consolidated the results of fallow will be; and (3) the government should protect the income of farmers after fallow as much as possible, implement flexible subsidy policies, and formulate corresponding policies to successfully consolidate the fallow results.

Keywords: cultivated land fallow; farmer group; hawk-dove game theory; compensation; decision-making behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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