The Behavior Mechanism of the Urban Joint Distribution Alliance under Government Supervision from the Perspective of Sustainable Development

Na Zhang, Xiangxiang Zhang and Yingjie Yang
Additional contact information
Na Zhang: School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000, China
Xiangxiang Zhang: School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000, China
Yingjie Yang: Institute of Artificial Intelligence, De Montfort University, Leicester LE1 9BH, UK

Sustainability, 2019, vol. 11, issue 22, 1-20

Abstract: Urban joint distribution is closely related to the national economy and people’s livelihood, and governments and enterprises play an active role in the process of urban joint distribution. From the perspective of government regulations, this paper explores the mechanism and evolution law of the behavior of an urban joint distribution alliance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, a model of homogeneous enterprises participating in urban joint distribution operations under the guidance of government regulations is constructed. The mechanism and follow-up of alliance behavior are analyzed through the simulation of the relationship between parameters. It is found that, firstly, from the perspective of government regulations, in the early stage of the implementation of urban joint distribution projects, when the benefits of synergetic cooperation of enterprise alliances are relatively low and the costs are relatively high, it is necessary for the government to formulate incentive policies to improve government subsidies or to increase the penalties for non-cooperation of enterprises; Once a benign logistics environment and market mechanism are formed, the cooperation benefits increase, and the costs decrease, the government can then withdraw its supervision. Secondly, in the process of establishing urban joint distribution alliance under government supervision, it is better for the enterprises to actively achieve alliance cooperation and obtain government subsidies instead of passively accepting government supervision and paying penalties, in order to promote the formation of logistics ecological environment and market mechanism.

Keywords: government regulation; urban joint distribution; distribution alliance; behavior generation mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/22/6232/pdf (application/pdf)
https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/11/22/6232/ (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:11:y:2019:i:22:p:6232-:d:284385

Access Statistics for this article

Sustainability is currently edited by Ms. Alexandra Wu

More articles in Sustainability from MDPI
Bibliographic data for series maintained by MDPI Indexing Manager ().