Experimental Study Based on Game Theory on the Private, Voluntary Supply Mechanisms of Goods for Forestry Infrastructure from the Perspective of Quasi-Public Goods
Liying Zhang (),
Chengliang Wu () and
Yang Zhang ()
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Liying Zhang: School of Economics and Management, Beijing Forestry University, Beijing 100083, China
Chengliang Wu: School of Economics and Management, Beijing Forestry University, Beijing 100083, China
Yang Zhang: School of Economics and Management, Beijing Forestry University, Beijing 100083, China
Sustainability, 2020, vol. 12, issue 7, 1-28
The existing research on forestry infrastructure has focused on suggestions from other areas of forestry research: that forestry infrastructure should be completed and improved. However, research on forestry infrastructure is relatively rare. In the real world, there are various problems with creating forestry infrastructure, such as complex approval procedures for facility construction, irrational facility layout, insufficient funding for facility construction, and conflicts between the nature of land used for facility construction and the nature of forest land. This paper uses game theory to analyze the behavior of forest infrastructure goods suppliers. Relevant parameters related to forest area infrastructure were designed, including communication, environmental certainty, information feedback, and reward and punishment mechanisms, and experimental economics methods were used to simulate accurate behavior regarding the supply of goods. Then, the key factors that affect the provision of quasi-public goods for forestry infrastructure were studied. At the end of the paper, some targeted suggestions that distinguish rural infrastructure from general infrastructure are given.
Keywords: forestry infrastructure; supply mechanism; game theory; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 O13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:12:y:2020:i:7:p:2808-:d:340279
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