An Optimal Dispatching Model for Integrated Energy Microgrid Considering the Reliability Principal–Agent Contract

Biyun Chen, Yanni Chen, Bin Li, Yun Zhu and Chi Zhang
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Biyun Chen: Guangxi Key Laboratory of Power System Optimization and Energy-Saving Technology, School of Electrical Engineering, Guangxi University, Nanning 530004, China
Yanni Chen: Guangxi Key Laboratory of Power System Optimization and Energy-Saving Technology, School of Electrical Engineering, Guangxi University, Nanning 530004, China
Bin Li: Guangxi Key Laboratory of Power System Optimization and Energy-Saving Technology, School of Electrical Engineering, Guangxi University, Nanning 530004, China
Yun Zhu: Guangxi Key Laboratory of Power System Optimization and Energy-Saving Technology, School of Electrical Engineering, Guangxi University, Nanning 530004, China
Chi Zhang: Guangxi Key Laboratory of Power System Optimization and Energy-Saving Technology, School of Electrical Engineering, Guangxi University, Nanning 530004, China

Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 13, 1-16

Abstract: As the increasing penetration of sustainable energy brings risks and opportunities for energy system reliability, at the same time, considering the multi-dimensional differentiation of users’ reliability demands can further explore the potential value of reliability resources in Integrated Energy Microgrid (IEM). To activate the reliability resources in a market-oriented perspective and flexibly optimize the operational reservation in dispatch, an optimal dispatching model in IEM considering reliability principal–agent contracts is proposed. We establish the reliability principal–agent mechanism and propose a cooperative gaming model of Integrated Energy Operator (IEO) and Integrated Energy User (IEU) based on the optimal dispatching model. At the upper level, the economic dispatching model of IEO is established to optimize the operation reservation, and the reliability principal–agent contract from users in the lower level would influence reliability improvement. Each IEU in the lower level maximizes its energy utilization and gives the corresponding reliability principal–agent incentives according to the reliability improvement degree and its actual demand. The bi-level model is solved by the KKT condition and strong duality theorem. A case study verifies the effectiveness of the proposed model in reducing the energy dispatch cost, improving the economic benefits of each participant, realizing the optimal allocation of reliability resources and optimizing the IEM energy structure, and the sensitivity analysis of dispatch cost with the user’s energy-using benefits is discussed.

Keywords: optimal dispatching model; reliability principal-agent contract; cooperative gaming; bi-level optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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