Governmental Anti-Pandemic and Subsidy Strategies for Blockchain-Enabled Food Supply Chains in the Post-Pandemic Era

Changhua Liao, Qihui Lu and Ying Shui
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Changhua Liao: School of Business Administration, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
Qihui Lu: School of Business Administration, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China
Ying Shui: School of Business Administration, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China

Sustainability, 2022, vol. 14, issue 15, 1-23

Abstract: Aiming to explore whether governments should choose anti-pandemic or subsidy strategies in the post-pandemic era, this study constructed a three-level food supply chain that was composed of a leading third-party logistics provider, a supplier and a retailer, in which the third-party logistics provider used blockchain technology for food traceability to address consumer concerns about food safety. We then used game theory to analyze the pricing decisions, traceability levels, anti-pandemic effort levels and subsidy levels of the supply chain under different governmental anti-pandemic or subsidy strategies. Our results showed that in all scenarios, the higher the consumer preference for traceability information, the larger the traceability levels and anti-pandemic effort levels and the more favorable the outcome for all parties; thus, governments should improve consumer awareness of pandemic prevention. For the benefit of all parties, governments should adopt anti-pandemic and subsidy strategies simultaneously, even in the post-pandemic era. Interestingly, for the scenario in which governments could only adopt one strategy, when the cost coefficient of traceability was small, the governmental subsidies would actually lead to lower traceability levels of the 3PL. This study could provide decision-making references for governments during the post-pandemic era and a new possibility for blockchain application.

Keywords: three-level food supply chain; blockchain technology; governmental strategy selection; traceability; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 Q Q0 Q2 Q3 Q5 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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